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In Part I, a rather detailed investigation is made of the question
of whether or not the U. S. Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks should become
involved with a program of technical assistance to lesser developed
countries. The results of this investigation indicate that the advantages
to both the Bureau of Yards and Docks and to the countries receiving
such assistance far outweigh the objections to and the disadvantages of
such a program.
An analysis is made in Part II of the need for technical assistance
in the Latin American and African areas based primarily on the local
availability of such services as evidenced by the restrictions placed on
the practice of engineering in the individual countries concerned. It
is concluded that, although a definite need for such assistance still
exists in Latin America, the greater need lies in the emerging African
nations.
Finally in Part III, the details of organizing and initiating an
African technical assistance program are developed by utilizing as a
starting point the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Also included in Part III
are the reasons for the selection of that particular country as the
initial focal point for such a program.
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A, Mission of The Bureau of Yards and Docks
It is of paramount importance that, before proceeding further, we
first determine whether or not the U, S. Navy's Bureau of Yards and
Docks (BUDOCKS) can and should have a definite role assigned in the
future history of developing foreign nations. The only part it can
play is encompassed in the area of providing technical assistance,
advice, information and services, which will henceforth be collected
under the categorical title of technical assistance and the exact
nature of which will be described in detail at a more appropriate
place in this paper. The provision of such technical assistance to
a foreign government can be and all too often is fraught with very
broad, complex and frustrating problems. If it is really not within
the purview or responsibility of the BUDOCKS organization to become
involved in this area of endeavor, then to do so would be to incur an
injustice upon itself and the U, S, Navy by needlessly complicating the
task of accomplishing its assigned military mission. Let us, therefore,
first examine this mission and attempt to discover whether or not such
a role is included therein, either explicitly or implicitly and, if so,
to define the interface of such a role with the objectives of the
Bureau as a military construction organization.
The responsibilities of the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks
have been officially assigned as follows: "The Chief of the Bureau of
Yards and Docks under the Chief of Naval Material, shall supervise and
command all functions and activities of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
including shore activities in providing the material support needs of
the Operating Forces of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the other elements
of the Naval Material Support Establishment and the other Supporting
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Organizations, and for Naval Construction Force support matters. The
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks as the Chief of Civil Engineers
shall act as principal advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Naval Personnel for military manpower management matters
related to the Corps of Civil Engineers,"
Broad though that statement may be, the perceptive reader will
note immediately that it can hardly be construed to encompass, explicitly
or even implicitly, the provision of BUDOCKS technical assistance to any
foreign nation, developed or lesser developed, and one may well ponder
once again exactly why and how this U. S, military construction
organization can and should become engaged in such activities. The
answer of course is simply that the provision of technical assistance
to foreign nations is not included within the assigned mission of the
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, This point is extremely
significant for reasons some of which may be obvious and others of which
will be elaborated upon shortly but fortunately it is not the whole
story. So for now let it just be well noted and, rather than stop at
this apparent impasse, let us probe a bit further into the question.
To be able to satisfactorily and successfully cope with the rather
broad statement of responsibilities iterated above, the Chief of the
Bureau of Yards and Docks has also been given a compensatingly broad
delegation of authority within established statutory and regulatory
limitations. An example of this delegation of authority is contained
in Article 0404 of U. S, Navy Regulations entitled "Manuals and
Other Publications" which reads as follows: "The Naval Technical
Assistants," which includes the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and
-5-

Docks among others," shall prepare and issue manuals and other
appropriate publications containing orders, instructions and proced-
ures, conforming to these regulations, and pertaining to matters
under their control. They shall insure that these publications
accurately delineate their respective fields of authority, as
mutually agreed upon by the bureaus and offices concerned, and in
2
conformity with decisions or policies of higher authority." In
exercising this prerogative, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and
Docks, having been assigned the responsibility for the effective and
efficient accomplishment of the BUDOCKS mission, has established the
following basic objectives for the Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) and the
Bureau of Yards and Docks:
"1. To direct the Civil Engineering effort in the Navy toward:
(a) Attaining maximum effectiveness and economy throughout
the shore activities of the Department of the Navy by
employment of the best engineering practices in the conduct
of governmental business.
(b) Supporting to the maximum possible extent the military
requirements of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
2. To extend Civil Engineer Corps and Bureau of Yards and Docks
services into those areas where the job can be done most
„3
effectively by a military civil engineering organization.
The first objective established by the Chief of the Bureau clearly
relates to the accomplishment of the assigned BUDOCKS mission. The
second, however, appearing as it were from nowhere, would seem to bear
-6-

no relation at all to BUDOCKS mission accomplishment. Indeed, it
might easily be projected as possibly interfering with that same mission
accomplishment by penetrating into areas that are neither the
responsibility nor the concern of the Bureau and might also lead to
charges of bureaucratic empire building. And yet the objective is
there, clearly, forcefully and explicitly included in the very briefest
outline of the Bureau's objectives. The choice of the word "extend"
in relation to CEC and BUDOCKS services is also considered to be
significant. The word is defined as "to stretch or draw out; to
4
cause to reach." The implications of the word are clear, that is,
it implies an active rather than a passive approach to the question;
a going out and doing rather than a waiting to be asked. It can
be construed to imply a selling of such services as distasteful as
the thought may be to some of the more rigorously professional minded
personnel, both military and civilian, in the BUDOCKS organization.
Regardless, the mandate is there and it is the obligation of all
subordinates to strive to achieve this objective as stated. However,
there are intelligent and dedicated military and civilian personnel
within the BUDOCKS organization who seriously question such extraneous
involvement and whose efforts in the pursuit of same are therefore
half-'hearted or, at best, far from enthusiastic. So rather than
blindly accept this edict as a fait accompli, let us in the following
paragraphs attempt to uncover the reasoning behind it and, while so
doing, establish any limitations or restrictions involved therewith.
-7-

B. Technical Assistance - Yes or No?
1. Objections
It may be well before beginning the exploration of this question,
to first define within the scope of this paper, the areas of such
assistance. As indicated by the title, we will deal exclusively with
BUDOCKS technical assistance to lesser developed countries. Such
assistance to developed countries is hardly required with but few
exceptions and, indeed, the proffering of same might be received as
being downright insulting. Assistance to other U. S. Governmental
Agencies is more readily and easily justified by Article 0416 of Navy
Regulations entitled "Work Done for Other Bureaus, Offices, or
Government Agencies" which reads in part: "Work may be performed by
one bureau or office for another bureau or office, or for another
Government agency, under such arrangements as are legal and
2
agreeable to the parties concerned." Such assistance is also well
established as evidenced in the past by the BUDOCKS' administration of
the Spanish Bases Construction Program for the U. S, Air Force and,
at the present time, the administration of the U. S, Agency for
International Development (USAID) Construction Program in Southeast
Asia, Other U. S, Governmental Agencies and in particular USAID will
appear on the scene, however, as they may relate to the activities in
question. Further, we will not include within the scope of this paper
BUDOCKS assistance to foreign navies under the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) which, again, is more readily understood and justified
and ^ell established. However, again, foreign military establishments
may well be encountered in our travels as they relate to the primary
objective. Finally, we will not pursue the question, though there
-8-

certainly be one in the minds of some, as to whether or not the U, S,
Government should, in general, provide assistance to lesser developed
countries. The policies and programs of our Government leave little
doubt as to its stand in this regard. This leaves us then to examine
in detail the role, if any, of BUDOCKS in. providing technical assistance
to the non-military sectors of foreign governments in lesser developed
nations.
Let us now launch our exploration of the question by first
examining the objections to such assistance. The primary objection
stems from the basic truism that providing such technical assistance
is not included in the basic mission assigned to the Chief of the
Bureau, With this there can be no argument and from it emanates the
explanatory elaboration that such assistance therefore detracts from
the accomplishment of that mission by diverting the Bureau's primary
and most important resource, personnel, from their properly assigned
tasks which must therefore suffer as a result. So at the very outset
we must establish our first and most important restriction and one
whose repercussions are rather widespread throughout all aspects of the
question, and that is that any such technical assistance must in no way
interfere with the primary military mission of the Bureau. This means
that, using an oversimplified example, if there exists a requirement
for a CEC officer in a U, S, Naval Construction Battalion and a
concurrent request for the assistance of a similar CEC officer from a
foreign government and only one such officer is available for assignment
at that particular time, then there can be no question as to where the
available officer must be sent. As mentioned previously, this can be
a severe restriction but one which must be maintained. Now it might
-9-

appear to follow, with apparent logic, that if the BUDOCKS organization
is properly staffed to begin with, then there should be no excess
personnel available for such other assignmentSo It must be remembered,
however, that, first of all, personnel requirements, particularly in a
construction organization, fluctuate with the volume of business with
the exception of personnel engaged in basic overhead functions. At the
same time, organizational staffing must be maintained to a certain
degree constant to avoid inefficient and damaging hiring and firing
over short term business cycles. This principle of low personnel
turnover applies to an even greater degree where career military and
civilian civil service personnel are concerned. Secondly and even more
important, the very nature of the functions of a military organization
dictate that it be overstaffed to a certain level during times of relative
peace in order to be able to respond immediately to mobilization
requirements which cover the broad spectrum ranging from providing
military advisors to an all out holocausto What better evidence of this
capability could we ask than the effective manner in which we have
responded to the demands of the Viet Nam situation which have to date
included the formation of four additional Mobile Construction Battalions
(MCB's) and other very high demands on our personnel numbers considering
the relatively small size of our organization. And yet the normal
activities of the Bureau continue uninterruptedlye So there must exist
at all times within the BUDOCKS organization a certain degree of over-
staffing subject to short term fluctuations. However, it can be argued
further that a reduction in the level of overstaffing by taking on
outside work can result in a diminished capability to respond effectively
to emergency requirements. But this only leads us back to our first
-10-

restriction that national military requirements take precedence over
international assistance. Personnel engaged in such international
efforts must therefore be considered as subject to immediate recall and
re-assignment as is any officer or assignment within the BUDOCKS organiza-
tion. So at this point, we are no worse or better off providing such
assistance than we would be if we did not.
However, the question probes deeper into our personnel structure
than that and it does so through the mechanism of what is termed a
reimbursable billet. Now there is established for BUDOCKS as for any
U, S, Governmental Agency a personnel ceiling which limits the numbers
of military personnel in the Civil Engineer Corps and civilians in the
BUDOCKS organization. However, when BUDOCKS personnel, civilian or
military, are assigned to billets outside of the Bureau's mission, these
ceilings are increased by the numbers of personnel so assigned. Hence
the term reimbursable billets. This is allowable because the other
organization must pay for such services and hence the personnel are not
charged against the Bureau's budget. So we arrive at our second
restriction on BUDOCKS' technical assistance, that is, that it must be
performed on a financially reimbursable basis. This is only logical.
We cannot expect to expend funds which have been appropriated by the
U, S, Congress to support the national defense efforts of the U, S,
Navy through defined BUDOCKS' activities, or the accomplishment of tasks
not related thereto, however well intentioned or justified they may be.
Indeed, if funds are available to support such efforts then we have
asked for and received more financial support than we really need, a
highly unlikely accomplishment in this age of severe and strict economic
operating limitations and budget justifications and an equally undesirable
-11-

one. So we must establish this second restriction to the effect that
all activities outside of the established mission of the Bureau must be
performed on a financially reimbursable basis. This restriction answers
the second objection to involvement in such efforts in that they are a
needless drain on the already limited financial resources of the Bureau,
Returning once again to the reimbursable billet concept, it may ap-
pear on the surface that the question of availability of personnel is
solved. Unfortunately this is not the case. What happens is that a
request for assistance generally requires a man with the experience and
maturity of a Lieutenant Commander or Commander or a comparably rated
civilian. Such a man cannot be immediately replaced as it is practically
impossible to pick another up off the street with comparable qualifications
willing to begin a military or civil service career at that stage in his
life. Instead, probably the best that can be done is to retain an
additional Lieutenant Junior Grade who is completing his obligated
service and applies for augmentation into the Regular Navy or to hire an
additional young trainee into the civil service organization. In
either case, there is a marked loss to the Bureau and perhaps the best
that can be done is to relieve the Commander with a Lieutenant -Commander,
relieve the Lieutenant Commander with a Lieutenant, and relieve the
Lieutenant with our new found Lieutenant Junior Grade, The result is
obviously a reduction in the level of experience and maturity of
personnel all along the line. However, to stop at this point is to be
guilty of short-sightedness. For, first of all, we now have available
a larger number of personnel that can be called upon to meet an emergency
situation, remembering our requirement that military needs take priority.
Secondly, if a certain number of such reimbursable billets can be
-12-

maintained within reasonable limits over a period of years, the personnel
structure will once again become stabilized. Finally, if the number of
such billets cannot be maintained then the future effects are
self-compensating, that is, we will eventually regain the services of our
more experienced personnels and, at that time, merely retain fewer junior
officers or hire fewer civilian trainees. In the interim we will have
had the benefit of insurance in the form of additional numbers of
personnel. Indeed, returning to the Viet Nam situation, one may well
ponder how much more easily the demands on our personnel numbers might
have been met if we had had personnel throughout the lesser developed
nations who could have been available for the required assignments. The
key to the system and our third restriction is only that such efforts
must be accepted on a very gradual basis to allow a slow and careful
building up of the base of our personnel structure and thereby avoid any
sudden and disruptive personnel demands. This is really only a matter
of common sense and exercising discretion in offering our services and
accepting resultant requests therefor.
Another real objection to BUDOCKS' technical assistance to lesser
developed nations is the question of competition with private enterprise.
This problem is a real one and more difficult to define in precise terms
than the others, for there are conflicting restrictions and requirements
involved. For example and on the one hand, we are definitely restricted
in our use of U. S. Naval Construction Forces (SEABEES) as follows: "It
is not Navy policy to employ MCB's in competition with civilian labor
in the continental United States or on the mainland of Alaska, However,
exceptions may be made for training purposes when the nature of the work
necessitates security that could not otherwise be assured, or where the
-13-

isolated location of the work to be performed makes it impractical to
obtain qualified civilian contractors. Lack of funds is not sufficient
justification for the use of military construction units."-* Here the
question of competition with civilian labor is clearly defined. However,
while utilizing to a very large extent the services of private A/E's
and consultants for our design efforts we also recognize the need to
maintain a certain degree of in-house design capability as evidenced by
our design staffs within the Bureau and its major field activities.
Certainly by so doing we are competing in a sense with private enterprise
but we recognize the need to do so. So, again, the problem is not very
clearly defined in terms of competition with private enterprise here in
the United States and far less so elsewhere as the implication of the
above quote is that, at least In so far as the U, S, Navy is concerned,
we are perfectly free to use our SEABEES in competition with civilian
labor anywhere else in the world. Yet we obviously have at least a
moral obligation to exercise at least the same restraint and prudence
in our international dealings as we would and do here at home. This is
recognized by the Chief of the Bureau and due consideration thereof
given as evidenced by the inclusion of the phrase "where the job can be
done most effectively by a military civil engineering organization" in
the previously quoted second objective for the CEC and the Bureau
relating to the extension of our services. Granted the determination
of whether or not a job can be done most effectively by a military or
by a civilian civil engineering organization can become a rather
nebulous thing. The military may have the advantage in terms of speed
of mobilization; the fact that it is a non-profit organization; training
and experience in working under extremely adverse conditions; built-in
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self sufficiency in terms of administrative, logistic and medical
capabilities; power to assign competent personnel to locations and
projects where recruitment of civilians may be impossible or at best
extremely costly; backup available in the very large and world wide
BUDOCKS organization; or a host of other perhaps less obvious reasons.
But regardless of the logic the point in the case in question is that
such a determination can only be made by the proper authorities in
the nation concerned whose responsibility it is to determine what is in
the national interest of the country, assuming of course a duly
constituted or representative government as evidenced by official U. S.
recognition thereof. So while this may appear to be passing the buck as
it were, the question of competition with private enterprise can only be
determined on a case by case basis by the nation concerned, one way
or the other, just as it has been and is here in our own country.
The last real objection, though it stems from one isolated
happenstance, is an important one and it relates to the real loss of
personnel through the medium of outside technical assistance as follows.
Well over ten years ago, one of our CEC officers was assigned to another
U. S, Governmental Agency to supervise that agency's construction
program in a particular overseas area. As a result of the strong and
repeated requests of that agency to have the officer remain because of
their satisfaction with his efforts and his own requests to remain for
personal reasons, he was permitted to do so and there he remained until
his retirement several years ago whereupon he continued in the job in a
civilian capacity. The point is that his services were completely lost
to the Bureau which, had it been compelled to recall him to meet an
emergency situation, would have found him to be of considerably less
-15-

^value than his rank would indicate because of his prolonged absence and
lack of familiarity with changing policies and procedures resulting
therefrom. So we must establish our fifth and final restriction that
personnel assigned outside the Bureau organization be permitted to
remain so assigned for only one normal tour of duty within the usual
allowable limits of that phrase.
The only real flaw in all of the above goes back to the first
restriction that such technical assistance must not interfere with the
accomplishment of the Bureau's primary mission. It is highly conceivable
that the situation will arise when the services of personnel who are
assigned to a foreign governmental agency will be required for certain
tasks within the Bureau organization. It is also conceivable that, in
spite of our concept of immediate availability of such personnel for
Navy missions, it may be politically inadvisable at the time to remove
such personnel from the country concerned because of the importance of
a project or program to that country or for other reasons. So our concept
of immediate availability is subject to breakdown. However, we can not
exist solely in the vacuum of the Navy construction organization. If
it is determined that a need exists which is greater than our own then
we must submit to the fact. Indeed the existence of such a need only
serves to prove the value of the technical assistance concept and our
own needs are always subject to and lesser than the overall needs of
our country.
2, Advantages
Merely answering the objections to BUDOCKS' technical assistance to
lesser developed countries is not, however, enough to justify such assist-
ance. We should now proceed further and explore the advantages of this
-16-

assistance to the Bureau, our own country and the country concerned. But
before so doing, let us summarize the restrictions we have arrived
at in the process of investigation:
1. That such assistance must in no way interfere with the
primary military mission of the Bureau except in such instances
where it is in the overall interest of our nation to do so,
2. That it must be performed on a financially reimbursable basis.
3. That such efforts must be accepted on a gradual basis to avoid
sudden and disruptive changes to our personnel structure,
4. That the question of competition with private enterprise can
only be resolved by the nation concerned,
5. That personnel assigned outside the Bureau organization be
permitted to remain so assigned for only one normal tour of duty
within the usual allowable limits of that phrase.
With these restrictions as a base, let us now proceed to explore
the advantages of the system, some of which have already been touched
upon.
The advantages to BUDOCKS are few but significant. We have
already noted the primary advantage in the building up of a broader and
larger base of personnel. As more and more personnel are assigned to
work outside the Bureau's primary military mission, these numbers can
become significant and provide the insurance of additional personnel
over the Bureau's established ceilings. These personnel would be available
to meet emergency situations as they may arise. But this is not the
whole story. There is, in addition, the more intangible advantage of
more diversified experience and greater responsibility for the personnel
assigned. It has been the writer's experience in Latin America and
-17-

generally speaking that of others who have been engaged in similar
efforts throughout the world and with whom the writer has had an
opportunity to discuss the subject, that our personnel on such assign-
ments find themselves in the sometimes embarrassing but always challenging
position of being considered as expert in all civil engineering matters
in the very broadest sense of the term. To cite but a very few examples,
our personnel have been asked to pass judgement on the final planning
for a complete port facility including a completely automated system of
banana handling equipment; the agricultural as well as the structural
features of flood prevention and control for an entire city; disaster
relief planning on a national level; and the feasibility of nuclear
power generating plants in remote and forbidding areas. Extreme care
must always be exercised in such a position for it has happened more
than once that an answer to a seemingly innocuous question has become
a matter of national policy the following day. But the rewards in
terms of personal maturity and mental stimulation resulting from such
challenging and diversified experiences are immeasurable and of the
greatest value to the individual and to the Bureau, Finally, there is
the advantage of furthering the world-wide name and reputation of the
Bureau and the Corps (CEC), an item which should always be in the minds
of us all.
Going beyond the interests of the Bureau and the Corps, there are
benefits to be reaped from such a program at the National level.
Many of the major development programs and projects in lesser developed
countries are wholly or in part U, S, financed. What better way to
insure their efficient execution than to have a non-profit U, S, civil
engineering organization with years of world-wide experience assist
-18-

therewith? What better way to further our overall goals of the foreign
assistance program than to provide the technical assistance on a
business-like paying basis in addition to the funding which by itself
is so often resented? What better way to extend the feeling of mutual
cooperation than to work side by side with foreign nationals in helping
them to achieve their dreams of national development? And what better
way to obtain the sorely needed economic project analyses and justifica-
tions, more of which will be said later, than to have assisting in the
preparation thereof personnel who have had to perform the same exacting
analyses to obtain the required funding for every project or program
that the Bureau has requested? In the opinion of the writer, the
fruits of such a program at the national level are even more inviting
than those at the Bureau level and we must always keep our sights at
this broader overview of the situation.
But we have dwelt long enough on our own selfish motives for
such a program. Let us now put ourselves in the position of the
governmental authorities of a lesser developed nation and investigate
the advantages, if any, available to that nation in the utilization of
our proffered services. The first and obvious one is the financial
savings potential in utilizing a non-profit organization. But the
financial story does not end there. As a result of our relatively
low pay scales, both military and civilian, the charges for such
services which would include only actual costs of salaries, expenses
and materials plus overhead, must be considerably lower than a private
firm, particularly in less desirable areas where a contractor must pay
a high premium to obtain qualified and competent personnel. In addition
and continuing in a financial vein, our extensive organization with well
-19-

staffed offices throughout the world means that, with few exceptions,
available personnel are greater in number and within closer proximity
than almost any private U, S, firm, therby reducing mobilization and
travel expenses. These items when summed together would, on their own
present an excellent argument for the utilization of our services but
there are aspects other than financial that are equally advantageous.
An extremely important part of any such assistance program is the
training of local personnel so that the financing agency, whether it be
the U, S, or the country concerned, can look ahead to the day when
such assistance is no longer required and the country becomes
self-sufficient in the particular area of endeavor. The objective of the
trainer then becomes working oneself out of a job. This particular
prospect is not a particularly inviting one to a profit oriented
organization which generally speaking, would much prefer to do the
work itself and continue doing it than to train another organization
to take its place. As a result, even if a private firm were to accept
the task, the transformation is apt to be slow and extended at best.
But even disregarding this hypothesis, it is proposed that the Bureau
has had far more and diversified experience in the area of training
than any private firm known to the writer. Training and readiness
are the primary objectives of a military organization and with its
inherent relatively high turnover rate, the process is a continuous and
well developed one. There are certainly other advantages previously
noted in terms of speed of response; training and experience in
working under extremely adverse conditions; built-in self sufficiency;
and BUDOCKS backup. But the real meat of the situation lies in the
areas of cost and training. It is on these items that the country
-20-

concerned should give considerable thought and reflection,
3. Disadvantages
It would be less than objective to contend that there are no
disadvantages inherent in BUDOCKS technical assistance to lesser develop-
ed countries. The only real one in so far as the Bureau and our Nation
are concerned is taking upon ourselves more responsibility than we
really need toj if we disregard for the moment any sense of moral
obligation that we may feel. In addition to merely complicating our
lives and our efforts with this extraneous work, we could conceivably
place ourselves and our Country in a most embarrassing and distastefjl
light in the eyes of the whole world through, for example, a major
engineering blunder or even as a result of political, economic or
social conditions which are completely beyond our control. It is the
contention of the writer however that we must place our trust and
confidence in our own capabilities and be always ready and willing to
put our reputation on the line in conjunction with our best efforts.
Further, we must be ever ready to accept new challenges and responsibili*
ties because there is in this life no standing still. We must either
press forward successfully as we have in the past or regress into
stagnation and eventually, oblivion, a rather strong statement but one
borne out daily in the histories of organizations and even nations.
Finally, we cannot ignore our moral obligation to do our part and bear
our share of the load in the development of emerging nations.
The possible disadvantages to a recipient nation are several.
There is the ever present sword of Damacles in the potential recall of
our personnel in an emergency situation, perhaps at a crucial time in
a project or program in that country. Without dismissing the threat
-21-

too lightly, such an eventuality is not considered to be too likely.
We would certainly be reluctant if only for political reasons to
leave a nation high and dry at a critical timeo A good case in point is
the history of two of our CEC officers assigned to the Brazilian and
Chilean Navies as civil engineering advisors. Each billet was established
as one two year tour of duty. Neither could be considered to be highly
critical or sensitive assignments. Yet in spite of the very critical
and heavy demands on our personnel as a result of the Viet Nam situation,
the officer in Brazil was allowed to complete his full two year tour
and the one in Chile remains chere at the time of this writing, some
six months beyond the expiration of his estimated two year tour. So
it may be concluded that while the threat does exist, it is not very
likely to be effected except in such a dire case that the nation
concerned, if in the least reasonable, would almost certainly not
object to but rather approve the move.
There may be however, another real objection to which, in some
cases, there may simply be no solution and that is a foreign military
presence in a highly sensitive nationalistic country. Certainly we
would arrive bearing no arms unless requested to do so and we could,
as we have several times in the past, wear only civilian attire while in
country. These restrictions along with previous factual press coverage
of the situation will relieve the objections in almost all cases and
with the exception of the rock throwing, library burning elements in
almost all countries will satisfy the questions of the populace. But
there will arise situations where a U, S, military presence under any
restrictions or conditions will simply not be tolerable for internal
or external political or other reasons. In such cases we have little
-22-

choice but to abandon our efforts in such areas until such time as our
presence is at least tolerable.
It is apparent then that at least in most instances, the advantages
of BUDOCKS' technical assistance to lesser developed countries far
outweigh the objections and disadvantages for the Bureau, our Country and
the recipient nation. If it appears that much attention has been given
to this matter it is only because the basic question of BUDOCKS'
technical assistance - yes or no? - must first be resolved once and
for all in the minds of all concerned before such a program can even
begin to show the results for which it possesses the potential. With
an affirmative answer to this basic question as a basis, we can now
proceed to investigate in Part II where our efforts may best be
directed in this area and, subsequently in Part III, how such efforts







There have been established by higher authority certain designated
geographical areas which have been assigned to either BUDOCKS or the
Corps of Engineers (CE), U, S, Army for responsibility for military
construction outside the United States, These instructions from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Logistics (OASD (I&L)) contained in what has come to be popularly
6
called the "Divide the World Memo," also apply to the USAID construction
programs in which the military construction agencies participate. The
participation of these agencies in work for foreign governments is
not specifically referred to in this memorandum, nor for that matter
is work for other U, S. Governmental Agencies, again with the exception
of USAID, However, the intent of the memorandum is very clearly stated
in its opening words which read: "In order to assure that design and
construction of military facilities are accomplished without duplication
of manpower and other resources in areas outside the United States, the
following additional geographic area assignments are made ,"
The concept of avoiding duplication of manpower and other resources in
areas outside the U, S, is extended to include participation in the
USAID construction program in a subsequent paragraph in the same memorandum
which reads in part: "pursuant to the DOD-AID" (Department of
Defense-USAID) "agreement, under which the military construction agencies
participate in the AID construction program, it is necessary that this
office be kept informed of the location and scope of all projects
undertaken to assure compatibility with the military construction assign-
ments," It is considered reasonable to assume that the same duplication
should also be avoided in work for other U, S, Governmental Agencies or
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in assistance of foreign governments. Indeed, we may well consider that
we have at least a moral obligation to do so. So let us therefore begin
our study of the potential market for BUDOCKS* technical assistance by
first relating these assigned areas of responsibility which are shown
in Figure 1, In addition to those designations listed in Figure 1, this
same memorandum also states: "The status of the Corps of Engineers, the
Bureau of Yards and Docks, and the Air Force with respect to design and
construction responsibilities remains unchanged in the United Kingdom,
Spain and Panama,"
Speaking in terms of lesser developed nations, it will be noted
that Central and South Africa and Latin America are the only major
areas which remain to be designated. The reason for the omission of
these highly significant areas is simple. There just has not been
sufficient activity in these areas in the past by either BUDOCKS or the
CE to justify the assignment of the areas to either oneo There are no
real military construction resources existent, therefore there are none
subject to duplication.
It is the intention of the writer to confine this study to these
two areas of Latin America and Central and South Africa, the latter of
which we shall hereafter refer to simply as Africa, remembering however
that it does not include that portion of North Africa assigned to the CE,
The reasons for this selection are several. First of all, the fact
that they are unassigned indicates the previous very low level of
activity therein and therefore adds to their possible potential regarding
the future utilization of BUDOCKS* technical assistance. Secondly,
considering all factors, political, economic, social and military, these
areas along with Southeast Asia are considered to be the most important
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Areas of Responsibility For Military Construction
Outside The United States «
Corps of Engineers, Department of The Array
1, Canada (excepting Newfoundland) and Greenland,
2, Europe, including The Azores.
3, North Africa from Morocco to Somali Republic,
4, The Middle East, and Southeast Asia to the western
borders of Laos and Thailand,
Bureau of Yards and Docks, Department of The Na-vy
1, Newfoundland
2, Iceland
3, Indian Ocean - Australia - New Zealand, including
the island complex north of Australia
4, Johnson and Midway Islands, and all other Pacific
Ocean islands not previously covered
under the Far Eastern Area construction. assignments,
5, Bermuda and the Caribbean Area, including
Puerto Rico and islands in the Caribbean Sea,





objects for all forms of U. S, assistance in the world today and should
remain so for some years to come. Granted this is a rather broad
statement but one with which few will disagree. With the degree of
assistance that is being provided in Southeast Asia today, it is with
no hesitancy that we can drop that area and concentrate on the others.
Finally, it would be less than honest to fail to recognize the fact
that since these areas are not currently assigned to either BUDOCKS or
the CE, there will ensue efforts on the part of both organizations to
obtain such assignments. It is obvious that there does exist a healthy
spirit of competition between the Bureau and the CE and it is equally
obvious that the first one to become established in either area has the
best chance of being assigned responsibility for military construction
therein, a goal certain to be sought by both. This is definitely not
to say that areas that are currently assigned to BUDOCKS should be
ignored in regard to their potential utilization of the Bureau's technical
assistance. But it does tie in very neatly with our other reasons for
their selection, that is, the apparent neglect of these areas in the
past, their inherent importance and the current saturation of assistance
in Southeast Asia, Let us then attempt to determine the potential





1. The Past and Present
In Initiating our examination of Latin America (LA) as a potential
market for the technical services of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and
the Civil Engineer Corps, it would be well to begin by reviewing the nature
and extent of such activities to date. Such a review will serve not only
to bring us up to date on the status of the Bureau's efforts in the LA
area but also to give us some idea of the nature and diversity of what
may be included under the general category of technical assistance. We
will confine our review to the period from 1960 to the present time. From
the termination of World War II until 1960, such activities were, for all
intents and purposes, non-existent in the Latin American area. While the
degree of effort subsequent to that time has been far from great, it does
relate to our investigation and is, therefore, worthy of a brief recapitu-
lation.
The first real attempt to establish and organize a program for the
activities of the Bureau and the Corps in the LA area came with the
establishment in 1961 of a billet for a CEC Lieutenant Commander dn the
staff of the Commander U, S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO)
with headquarters in the Panama Canal Zone, The primary mission of this
Command was and still remains the supervision of the Navy portion of the
U, S, Military Assistance Program and the U, S, Naval Missions in Latin
America, The primary duty of the CEC officer assigned to this staff was,
therefore, to coordinate BUDOCKS' assistance to the U, S, Naval Missions
and the Military Assistance Program, He was also charged, however, with
the responsibility to endeavor to extend the services of the Bureau and
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the Corps to U= Sc and foreign governmental agencies that could utilize
same, with particular attention to the USAID programs in that area. The
reason for this particular emphasis was the success vrith which the
Bureau was administering the USAID construction program in Southeast Asia
to the advantage of itself, the USAID organization and the countries
concerned. There was no apparent reason why the same could not be done
in Latin America with equal chances of success o It was also considered
to be the best avenue ot approach to the potential utilization of the
Bureau's and the Corps' services by the non-military public sectors of
the LA economies
.
The recognition of the need for such a billet and the potential for
such services was brought about by four separate and unrelated occurrences.
After the disasterous earthquake of 1960 in Chile, the Navy of that country
requested the assistance of the U. S. Navy in rebuilding a seriously
damaged pier at their shipyard at Talcuano across the bay from Concepcion.
As a result of this request, a CEC Commander was sent to the site where
he prepared the preliminary design for the repairs to the pier^ Subsequ-
ently in 1962, a Seabee team of one CEC Lieutenant Commander and ten
men arrived at the site where they remained in gradually diminishing
numbers until 1965, supervising the repairs to the pier and training
shipyard personnel in all aspects of the work, administrative and technical
as well as in the construction trades involved o At approximately the same
time in 1960, a request was received from the Ecuadorian Navy for assistance
with the modernization of their Naval Academy at Salinas. This resulted
in another Seabee team being sent to that site where they remained from
1961 through 1962 performing the same functions as the team in Chile.
Again at approximately the same time, a third Seabee team was deployed
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to Haiti to construct an emergency bridging facility to replace a critical
bridge destroyed by a flash flood in that country. Shortly after these
three requests, arrangements were made with USAID and the Government of
the Dominican Republic for a third Seabee team to open and operate a
school for the training of civilian equipment mechanics and power linemen,
two trades in extremely short supply in the country. The team arrived
in 1962 and the school functioned from the time of its opening in 1963
until it was closed by the forced withdrawal of the team, necessitated
by the cessation of U, S, aid to that country after the military overthrow
of the Bbsch regime. It was subsequently reopened but finally closed once
again by the civil strife in that country.
So as a result of these four unsolicited requests for technical
assistance the COMUSNAVSO billet was established and efforts initiated
to organize and expand such services in the LA area. The success of the
four initial Seabee teams was outstanding in both the technical aspects
of their work and in their acceptance by and relations with the people
in the countries concerned. The readiness and willingness of the men to
pitch in and work with their hands with the people was noted as, unfortunate
as it may be, not being typical of U. S, assistance, with the notable
exception of Peace Corps efforts. But even the latter were marked by a
general lack of the experienced and mature personnel which comprised the
Seabee teams.
However and in spite of this auspicious beginning, the program never
really developed to the extent that might have been expected. The first
officer assigned to the COMUSNAVSO billet of necessity spent most of his
two year tour from 1961 to early 1963 making the contacts required to
initiate the program in a formal manner, a formidable job for one man
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in such a large area. Accomplishments during this period included
arranging for the assignment of a CEC officer as civil engineering
advisor to the Brazilian Navy; the preliminary design of an ARD mooring
facility for the Colombian Navy at Cartagena; technical assistance with
the efforts of the Seabee teams in Chile and Ecuador; the deployment of
another Seabee team to Haiti to effect repairs to a municipal pier at
Port au Prince; and preliminary planning for a proposed submarine base
for the Peruvian Navy at Ahcori. Efforts to expand beyond the military
sector during this time were very limited and for the most part unsuccess-
ful.
Subsequent to this period, prospects brightened somewhat and activities
expanded considerably, partly as a result of previous contacts made but
primarily through highly intensified efforts directed at the potential
public sector of the L. A, market, chiefly through the USAID in - country
organizations each of which was personally contacted and advised of the
availability and scope of BUDOCKS' assistance. To be sure efforts continu-
ed in the military sector with the arrival in country of the CEC advisor
to the Brazilian Navy and the establishment and fulfillment of a similar
billet with the Chileaa Navy. In addition, a study was made for the
Uruguayan Navy of their drydocking facility at the port of Montevideo
by the BUDOCKS' field office in San Juan which also executed the final
design of the ARD mooring facility at Cartagena Colombia, the design of
coastal watch towers for the Guatemalan Navy and the design of a small
boat repair facility on Lake Maracaibo for the Venezuelan Navy, The
Colombian Navy was also assisted in the planning of a military and
commercial ship repair facility at Buenaventura, But of far greater
importance and significance was the breakthrough into the non-military
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public sector, primarily through the USAID in-country organizations.
A CEC Commander filled the temporary need for a general engineer within
the USAID organization at Recife, Brazil and a Junior Grade CEC Lieutenant
served in the same capacity with USAID Costa Rica. The eruptions of Mount
Irazu in the latter country with the resultant flooding of the City of
Cartago led to the design of flood control structures for the Government
of Costa Rica by the Bureau's San Juan office and the dispatch of another
Seabee team with heavy earthmoving equipment to that city where they
assisted with flood control measures and trained Costa Rican civilians
in the operation and maintenance of the heavy construction equipment.
In other areas, a port study was performed for the city of Montevideo,
Uruguay; the Government of Ecuador was assisted in the planning of a
complete new port facility including an entirely automated banana hand-
ling system, in the vicinity of Guayaquil; the Mexican Government was
assisted in the study of a rather rapidly settling pier; an electrical
power study was performed for several cities in Ecuador; and another for
western Costa Rica, Indeed, in some cases requests for assistance exceeded
the capabilities to respond as in the case of a request for a complete
MCB from a U. S, Ambassador to meet an emergency situation in his assigned
country. Unfortunately a battalion could not be spared because of the
U, S, Navy's own requirements at that time. In another instance in mid
1965 and one which was to mark the end of an era, so to speak, of the
Bureau's LA program and which coincided with the relief of the second
officer in the COMUSNAVSO billet, a request for Seabee teams to supervise
and train civilian personnel in community development and road building
in another LA country was also regretfully rejected because of the fast
rising demands of Viet Nam, The situation in the latter country and the
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increased demands upon our personnel to cope with it have led to the
current status of our LA program which, with the exception of the
maintenance of the CEC billet on the COMUSNAVSO staff, is mon-€xistent>
This is extremely regretful not only from the standpoint of the countries
concerned but also because we shall now never know for sure what might
or might not have developed from these preliminary LA efforts. The
program might have continued to grow as it had in its last two years
or, once having filled these initial requests for assistance, it may
have merely met a natural death from lack of demand. Indications can be
found for both hypotheses. The next two years would have told the story
one way or the other but now it will never be told, at least not for
some time to come. But eventually and, hopefully soon, the course of
events in this world will return us to relatively normal times and the
question of BUDOCKS' technical assistance in the LA area will once more
take on real meaning. In the interest of and in preparation for that
time, we shall now proceed to attempt to make a theoretical analysis of
the potential utilization of such services in lesser developed nations
and begin by continuing in the LA area,
2. The Future
The writer proposes that the need for essential goods or services in
a particular country can best be measured or determined by that country's
official policy toward the importation of such goods or services as
evidenced by the existence of any legal or official restrictions thereon.
The emphasis is on essential goods and services to avoid the realm of
import restrictions on non essential goods and services, the purpose of
which may be solely to strengthen a nation's balance of payments and
foreign trade position. But essential goods and services must be had and
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restrictions on the import thereof may only be imposed to the extent
that the country itself can fill the need or the gaps as the case may be.
For example, a country completely lacking a basic necessity of life can
ill afford a high import tariff or strict import restrictions on same,
thereby rendering it more expensive or difficult for its people to obtain.
But as it develops its own source of that particular good or its own
capability to perform that particular service, import restrictions can
be continually raised and toughened until they become practically import
exclusive when the country has developed its own self sufficiency, to
protect its national interests and strengthen its balance of payments
position. The criticality of the latter problem in all nations and
particularly in developing nations is well recognized. The writer further
proposes that technical services in the field of civil engineering and
its related disciplines do comprise a service that is essential to a
nation and one of the key building blocks upon which all nations must
rest the foundations of strong and healthy economies. This correlation
becomes clearly evident when one considers the role of the engineer in
the areas of urban and rural planning and development; low cost housing;
development of natural resources; transportation; rural electrification;
economic project analyses; and so on through the list of programs
essential to developing nations.
From these two hypotheses it follows that an examination of the
restrictions imposed upon the practice of engineering by foreign nationals
in a particular country may well reveal a very good indication of the
extent to which such services are available in that country. Attempts
or efforts to quantitatively measure such restrictions have been most
unrewarding and fruitless. However, some interesting results have been
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obtained in a qualitative analysis of these restrictions by the writer,
results which, surprisingly enough, indicate a very good correlation of
the facts between almost all countries within the two geographical areas
under consideration. It must be recognized that the basic data is not
precisely accurate nor is it even complete as admitted in the source,
the "Engineers* Overseas Handbook," It is, however, generally accurate
as of January 1965 and, as will be seen, does present a good indication
of the restrictions placed on foreign engineers in the countries concerned
and, therefore, following our hypotheses, the availability of such services
in those countries.
There are many factors which might be included under the general
category of restrictions on the practice of engineering by foreigners or
as indicative of the state of the art in a particular country. We shall
confine ourselves however only to those factors that relate purely to
engineering practice and shall exclude those others that relate to any
and all foreign businesses or services. We shall, therefore, not consider
such factors as requirements for local representatives, the extent of
local participation required in contracts, restrictions on convertibility
of currency or repatriation of fees, -or corporate and other taxes, all
of which apply to all businesses and services. What we will examine is
whether a license issued by the country concerned is required to practice
engineering in that country and the requirements to obtain such a license
or to merely practice engineering in the country, as the case may be.
These two factors are considered to present the key to the answer of our
question of the in-country availability of engineering services. In
addition we will also note the number of engineers available in each
country, where and to the extent that such information is available, as
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a point of general interest. This information is compiled and presented
in Figure 2 for the Latin American area.
It should be noted from Figure 2 that of the twenty countries
reporting, ten or exactly half of them require an examination in the
local language before a foreigner is permitted to practice engineering
regardless of his previous education or experience. Of the remaining
half, two require a diploma from a recognized university plus local
citizenship or permanent residency; six require a diploma from a
recognized university; and only two have no requirements for the practice
of engineering. Or from another standpoint, fifteen require a local
license; two do not require a local license but require an examination;
one requires registration and a diploma; and, once again, two have no
requirements at all. For the present, we shall merely note this data
well but without further comment and proceed to take a look at the situa-
























































































































General - All exams are technical exams given in the national language.
Diplomas are in almost all cases specifically required to be
from recognized universities.
N.A. indicates information not available or unknown.
1 unless under contract by universities. Government agencies
or private organizations. Exception applies only for duration
of contract and must be registered in a special register.
but may be employed by Brazilian firm without having a license,
including questions on Brazilian history, geography, the
Portuguese language and technical matters related to
engineering.




5 unless represented by or affiliated with Colombian engineering
firms, or employed by foreign government agencies or locally
established foreign companies.
6 unless employed by a foreign company under contract to the
Dominican Government but all work for the Ministry of Public
Works must be signed by a licensed Dominican engineer.
7 diploma from the University of Panama or an institution
recognized by the university: registration with the Minister
of Education; Panamanian citizenship or permanent residence;
a good conduct certificate; reciprocity to Panamanian engineers
by country of origin. Foreign engineers may be employed if
Panamanian engineers with the required capability are not
available. All plans must be signed by licensed engineers.
If a contract is for more than a year, a Panamanian engineer
must be hired and trained to replace the foreign engineer at
the end of the year.
8 unless working on a program financed by foreign capital.
9 reportedly difficult even for Salvadorans graduated from
foreign universities to obtain licenses.
10 but exam and diploma still required to practice.
11 a foreign engineer cannot practice at all except as a temporary
resident invited to do a specific job.
12 degree in engineering which must be revalidated in Spanish
if from a foreign university; certificate of good conduct from
the Attorney General; current receipts from the Internal Revenue
Department showing payment of all taxes due; application for
license to Ministry of Public Works, accompanied by documents
which prove compliance with all formalities required by previous
laws; admission to country as permanent resident aliens; and
permanent personal identification documents.
13 unless employed by a firm operating under contract with the
Paraguayan Government
.
14 but must have degree from the University of Uruguay.
15 except if under contract for a specified time, subject to the





To date there has been no real effort to initiate or organize a
BUDOCKS or CEC program on the African continent. Indeed, with the
exception of isolated and unrelated instances in Liberia, Chad and the
Central African Republic, that vast geographical area remains for all
intents and purposes deprived of any such technical assistance by the
U. S. Navy's construction agency. There being no real past history to
relate, we shall proceed immediately to make the same analysis to the
requirements for the practice of engineering in Central and South Africa
as we have just done for Latin America. This analysis, presented in
Figure 3, is derived from the same source, the "Engineers' Overseas
Handbook."^
From Figure 3 we see that of the twenty-six countries reporting,
none require any sort of an examination before a foreigner is permitted
to practice engineering. Indeed, only four of the twenty-six even
require a diploma to practice; three require only the submission of
qualifications; nine solely require registration or compliance with
immigration or employment requirements; and ten have no requirements at
all. Or again from another standpoint, only five countries require a
local license one of which has no technical requirements to obtain same;
one does not require a local license but does require a diploma to practice;
two others require only the submission of qualifications; and the remain-
ing eighteen have no technical requirements at all.
Let us now proceed to compare these results from Africa with those























(LeopoldvjLlle) No None N.A.
Dahomey Yes""" Diploma N.A.
Gabon No Qualified in
Home Country
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Ivory Coast No None 1502
Kenya No^ None no*
Liberia Yes Annual Fee and
Permit to Work
6
Malagasy Republic No None N.A.
Malawi No None 36
Mali No None N.A.
Mozambique Yes Diploma and
Registration
N.A.
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General - N.A. indicates information not available or unknown.
1 unless employed by the United Nations or a foreign government
on an economic assistance program.
120 Europeans and 30 Africans.
except for sanitary engineers under the Water Ordinance of 1951.
19 registered under the Water Ordinance.
all European.
but must satisfy the requirements of the Nigerian Immigration
Act and comply with the provision of the Companies Act if propose
to set up practice as a corporation.
16 of which are of sufficient stature to be classified as
consulting engineering firms.





A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 reveals a marked dissimilarity
between Latin America and Africa in the area of restrictions placed on
the practice of engineering by foreign nationals. Of particular Sig-
nificance is the fact that 50% of the Latin American countries require an
examination in the local language regardless of previous education or
experience, while none of the African countries have any examination
requirements. From another standpoint, only 10% of the Latin American
countries have no technical requirements whatever for engineering
practice while 73% of the African countries have no such technical
requirements. The latter fact in particular indicates a definite need
for engineering services in the African area. With these services in
such short supply, 73% of the countries can afford no technical require-
ments whatever preliminary to the practice of engineering. The situation
is so serious that the door is literally open in those countries for
anyone who may have the barest knowledge of a technical discipline
to practice engineering.
Going back to Latin America, we may well ask if we may therefore
logically conclude from the information presented in Figure 2, that there
is no real need for technical assistance in this geographical area.
This question is a bit more difficult to answer when compared to the
obvious need in Africa. The information in Figure 2 certainly indicates
a relatively strong degree of protectionism with regard to engineering
services in most of the countries of the L, A. area. However, we are
faced with statements like the following which would tend to belie any
resultant supposition that there is, therefore, no real need for technical
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assistance. In editorializing favorably on the operations of The
Inter-American Development Bank, The Chase Manhattan Bank of New York
states "However, through no fault of its own, its operations appear to
be hampered by a scarcity of sound, well formulated projects.
. . ,
The availability of funds is not the only factor holding back loans from
the IDB, as well as from the World Bank, the Exportrlmport Bank and the
Agency for International Development. Most observers agree that available
funds are not being completely utilized because of a lack of sound
projects .... It is ironic, and most unfortunate, that countries so
in need of capital to improve their development should lack the projects
to put the capital to effective use. But this is part of the reason for
their underdevelopment What is needed is more and better education,
Q
technical training, and a host of other improvements
. , .
," Statements
such as these and others in a similar vein might be construed to contradict
our basic hypothesis relative to the need for technical assistance being
a function of the restrictions placed on engineering practice or, at the
very least, to question its validity. However, it has been the writer's
experience in Latin America that the state of the art in private practice
is not at all comparable to and is actually far superior to the state of
the art in governmental agencies. There are two basic reasons for this
dichotomy. First, pay scales for engineers in governmental agencies are
far below those obtainable in private practice. Such a disparity is
not an unusual situation and is in fact one that is prevalent throughout
the world. However, in Latin America and other lesser developed areas,
the spread between the two is far greater and other factors which, in
more developed countries, tend to compensate for the disparity in wages
are not in evidence. Instead of the relative security of civil servant
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status, such positions are prone to be far more susceptible to political
manipulation. Other compensating factors such as grievance procedures,
retirement benefits and seniority are also in almost all cases non-existent,
thereby completely shattering any concept of security which is usually
the mainstay of civil service. Secondly, while a lack of inherent tal^
ent in an organization might be overcome by utilizing outside services,
the budgets of these governmental agencies do not permit this alternative.
So while the engineering talent may be available in-country, it is
generally not available to the governmental agencies that need it.
But for the purposes of this paper, a discussion of the exact degree
of need in Latin America is strictly academic. It is obvious from a
comparison of Figures 2 and 3 that whatever the exact degree of need may
be for technical assistance in the L, A, area, the need in Africa is far
greater and much more urgent. Further, through the maintenance of the
CEC billet on the CCMUSNAVSO staff, the L. A. program can be resumed as
soon as circumstances permit. But there exists at the present time no
such mechanism to effect such a program on the unassigned portion of the
vast and needy African continent. We shall therefore devote the remainder
of this paper to developing a method of approach for an organized
program of Bureau of Yards and Docks and Civil Engineer Corps technical
assistance to Africa where, from the information previously presented,
we can anticipate far more striking and productive results than those
obtained from our previous but unfortunately rather short-lived efforts in
Latin America. Butinour travels eastward, let us by no means forget that
we still have an important and yet to be fully played role in the continued






A. Lessons From The Past
Before delving into a method of approach for initiating a program of
Bureau of Yards and Docks and Civil Engineer Corps technical assistance
in Africa, it would be well to review for a moment the two basic lessons
learned from experiences in this field in the Latin American area, for
the application of these lessons will have a direct bearing on the
method of approach to be applied in Africa,
First of all, because the Bureau and the Corps are Navy organizations,
there will be a very strong tendency on the part of both U, S, and
foreign officials to view these organizations from the standpoint of
having an inherent expertise in waterfront facilities - and only in
waterfront facilities. Even citing past accomplishments in other
engineering fields at great length will not, in most cases, change these
preconceived opinions to any significant extent. But as a matter of
fact, such notions are not at all unreasonable in this era of speciali-
zation which generates experts not only in particular engineering and
scientific disciplines but in the numerous and sometimes minute
subdivisions of those disciplines. This same specialization is prevalent
in numerous U, S, Governmental Agencies, any one of which might provide
technical assistance to a lesser developed nation in a particular field.
The Bureau of Public Roads in highway and road construction, the Federal
Aviation Agency in airfield construction, the U, S, Army Corps of
Engineers in flood control, and the Tennessee Valley Authority in electrical
power generation and distribution are but a few examples. Nor is the
list limited to federal agencies. Indeed, an organization such as the
Port of New York Authority would compare quite favorably to the Bureau
and the Corps in experience and ability in the field of waterfront
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construction and development. The fact that the Bureau has many
accomplishments in the areas of the examples cited above and others
does not change the fact that it does not specialize in those fields
as do certain other agencies. However, lest we become overwhelmed
with the concept of specialization; we must remember that there still
exists a very definite need for the general practitioner in the field
of engineering as there does in the field of medicine. The only point
is that it should not come as a complete surprise to have the Bureau's
services rejected on a particular project in favor of another agency
considered to be more expert in the field. In view of all the above,
it would appear that rather than fight the tide of specialization it
might be far better to go along with it and approach an African program
through the medium of expertise in waterfront facilities. This approach
might also be used as a stepping stone to the status of general practition-
er but this concept is a bit premature at this point and will be left for
now for subsequent further development in the final section on method of
approach.
The second lesson to be learned from past experiences in Latin America
is that approaching the non-military public sector of the African
economies through the USAID organizations in Washington or in-country
does not necessarily guarantee success. Far from it. In many cases
and for very good reasons this approach only compounds the problems
rather than simplifying them. In some cases an in-country USAID organ-
ization ma,y be attempting to build up its own engineering capability and
the import of Bureau personnel could spell disaster for such plans. The
same might be true of the supporting USAID engineering organization for
that area in Washington, Further, U, S, Governmental personnel overseas
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are equally if not more sensitive to the presence of U, S, military
personnel in their countries as the local populace, particularly
any large scale presence. Hence the rather frequently encountered
requirement for military personnel to wear civilian attire when on
assignment in foreign countries and the general reluctance encountered
at the proposal of the assignment of any significant numbers of such
personnel. This should by no means be construed as an anti-military
sentiment on the part of other U, S. personnel assigned overseas but
rather a well founded and rightfully cautious approach to the question
of a U, S, military presence in a foreign country. But all this is
certainly not to say that the USAID organizations are to be avoided. On
the contrary, they can be extremely helpful in pointing out areas of
possible assistance and in establishing required contacts. They can
also be expected to utilize the Bureau's and the Corps' technical
services on particular projects. But unless a military situation should
develop in Africa similar to the one which has unfortunately evolved In
Southeast Asia, the USAID organization, in general, should not be relied
upon to aid and abet any large scale build-up of Navy construction
personnel in Africa unless and only unless other general conditions make
it extremely difficult to recruit required personnel for their own
organizations.
So, in proceeding to Africa, the Bureau should:
1) Attempt to capitalize on its inherent expertise in the planning,
design and construction of waterfront facilities,
2) Seek other means in addition to the USAID organization to
establish and maintain an African program.
The how of the first and the what of the second will be developed in
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the final section of this paper relating to the method of approach. But
let us first turn to the problem of initiating the program and, in
particular, the question of where such efforts might first be directed.
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B. Initiating the Program
1. The Problem - Where To Start?
The first requirement for the organization and initiation of a
program of Bureau of Yards and Docks and Civil Engineer Corps technical
assistance to African nations is for the establishment of a CEC billet
somewhere in the area which can be utilized to effect such a program.
The existence of the COMUSNAVSO staff In the Panama Canal Zone rendered
the selection of the physical location of such a billet for the LA
area a relatively simple determination, though consideration was also
given to the establishment of that billet within the organizational
structures of both the Commander U. S. Naval Forces South Atlantic
(COMSOLANT) located at Trinidad and the Commandant Tenth Naval District
(COMTEN) with headquarters at San Juan, Puerto Rico. But the Canal Zone
presented the natural selection because of Its location between Central
and South America and the frequency of scheduled flights both commercial
and, more important, military from that location north and south into all
areas of Latin America. The ready accessibility of space available
military air transportation supplemented by numerous commercial flights
was a very important factor in the location of a billet that was to
require extensive and frequent travel into all areas of Latin America
on a very limited travel budget. The presence of the U. S. Naval Missions
In all the larger LA countries and the existence of the U. S. Navy
Military Assistance Program to those countries also provided numerous
requirements and opportunities for travel chargeable to those functions
during which time could be made available to devote to efforts to penetrate
the non-military public sectors of the LA economies. If this appears
to be placing too much emphasis on what might be considered to be the
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relatively insignificant item of travel expenses, it is only because it
was a very real problem, A certain amount of such costs can be absorbed
by the Bureau's overhead charges for work subsequently accomplished but
when such travels produce little or, in many instances, no such subsequent
requests for assistance then the expenditure of funds for such purposes
becomes a highly questionable item from a strictly economic viewpoint.
The Bureau is more than ready to authorize such expenditures within
reasonable limits in anticipation of recovering them to some extent
at least in future overhead charges. But when results are not forthcoming
to any appreciable extent and it is a fact that such efforts can be and
often are extremely non-productive, then futher expenditures in pursuit
of same become highly suspect to say the least.
Returning now to Africa where the same problems can be anticipated,
we are immediately struck with the fact that there does not exist any
natural location for the establishment of the billet we have in mind.
The nearest existing U, S. Navy staffs suitable for such a billet are
in the Azores, Madrid and Naples, Scheduled military air transportation
from those locations to Africa is non-existent and commercial air is not
really very much better. Further, remembering that the Army Corps of
Engineers has already been assigned responsibility for North Africa, the
locations mentioned are considerably far removed from the market. Finally,
U, S, Naval Missions and U, S, Na-'/y Military Assistance are for all intents
and purposes, if not actually, also non-existent in the market area. So,
lacking a natural location for the establishment of our billet, we must
create an artificial one and review and perhaps revise our criteria for
its selection.
Finding ourselves completely lacking both in scheduled military air
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transportation in the area and in an excuse if you will for travel in
connection with Naval Mission or MAP matters, the following two optimum
criteria naturally follow in determining where to establish our billet:
1) The billet should be physically located in a country which
r possesses the largest potential market for the Bureau's and the
Corps' technical services,
2) The country should be centrally located with respect to the
remainder of the market area to facilitate and minimize the
cost of travel thereto.
These two criteria are not necessarily compatible. In weighing the
relative merits of various locations, the emphasis should be placed on
the former because of the importance of initially establishing a successful
program in at least one country from which efforts can subsequently be
expanded and also because the costs of travel throughout the area will
not vary to any significant degree from one location to another, barring
extremes. Finally, an exact determination of other promising countries
as the program develops is for the present indeterminate and beyond the
scope of this paper, the purpose of which is to deal only with the
initialization of the program.
Additional problems in connection with the lack of an existing
organizational structure within which to establish the billet will be
taken up in the final section on the method of approach. But let us
now examine in some detail the logic behind our selection of the starting
point for the organization and initiation of our program - the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (FRN),
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2, The Federal Republic of Nigeria
The selection of a particular country in which to concentrate initial
efforts in the establishment of an African technical assistance program
becomes a rather difficult task in view of the numerous countries to
be considered in such a selection and the equally numerous arguments
which can be generated both for and against the proposed selection of
each one. However, the designation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
as the logical take-off point for the program was far from arbitrary.
The FRN is Africa's most populous state. It is, in fact, rated as one
of the few African countries with an internal market large enough to
support modern industrial plants. Its currency, the Nigerian pound,
equal to $2,80 U, S,, has had a history of stability. Nigeria is consider-
ed to be rich in that resource which has probably more than any other single
factor been the key to internal wealth in the economic history of nations -
oil, as witness Kuwait and others. Indeed, in the case of Nigeria, it
is estimated that by 1970 earnings in this industry could be in the
neighborhood of 250 million Nigerian pounds annually ($700 million U, S.)
or more than all Nigeria's exports earned in 1963 or 1964,
All of the above relates to the country's ability to attract external
investment and to develop internal capital and hence gives some indication
of the financing available now and in the future for internal development
in the form of capital projects. But there exists another very important
aspect to be considered in such considerations, that is, political
stability and the writer would be remiss in omitting a discussion of
that factor, particularly in view of the circumstances as presented in
the following paragraphs.
The writer must confess to having selected the Federal Republic of
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Nigeria prior to the military coup which transpired in that country in
January 1966 and to having given considerable weight to that country's
previous history of political stability in making the selection. Nigeria
had, in fact, for the well over five years which had lapsed since the
time of its independence from Great Britain on 1 October 1960, exhibited
a capacity for successfully overcoming successive political crises, by
no means a minor accomplishment when viewed in the light of contemporary
African history. Equally important, the FRN, significantly almost alone
among the African states, had preserved during that time a free press,
an independent judiciary and a free party system. Though the last had
not been free of charges of alleged local intimidation and malpractices
and certainly without attempting to condone same, this is hardly a
unique internal condition as witness the sometimes harrowing reports of
last year's elections in the Philippines and similar cases in recent
years throughout the world.
The record of political stability in Nigeria was then, to say the
least, rather impressive. The writer therefore, was no less surprised
than the rest of the world at the course of events which unfolded during
the military coup of January 1966, to which the general reaction of the
world is perhaps best summed up by "Time" magazine's statement that
"It was all the more shocking because Nigeria in its five years of
9
independence has been held up as a showcase of stable African democracy."
The writer's immediate reaction to the coup was one of despair at having
apparently lost what had up to that time appeared to be the obvious and
logical starting point for the Bureau's African program. But time and
the efforts of the military regime to effect economic, social and
political stability have all tempered that initial reaction. Further
-54-

and without rationalizing or attempting to justify same, military coups
are to the writer a very real though cold and hard fact of political life
in lesser developed nations, after having spent well over two years
working throughout the LA area. The writer was in fact present at a
military reception in the Dominican Republic during which he shook the
hand of the President of the Republic, Juan Bosch, on the very night
and only hours before he was subsequently forcibly removed from office
by his leading military officers. This too in a country which had
come to be known as a "showcase" of American democracy. And the same
story has been repeated numerous times and in most recent years in
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil and, at the very time of this writing
at the end of June 1966, in Argentina, to cite but a very few examples
in the "better" developed LA area.
So again, in retrospect and without being in any way complacent about
such matters, the Nigerian coup is not considered to be sufficient
grounds on which to change the original selection, though it will remain
a rather large mark against the previously enviable record of political
stability. But there are factors other than those previously mentioned
which make the selection of that country an extremely difficult one to
reject.
The USAID in reporting on U. S. technical and capital assistance in
support of economic development in Nigeria states that "The United States
is impressed with the extent to which Nigeria is committing its own
resources to well conceived development plans, its ability to absorb
foreign assistance and the sense of social justice that pervades its
planning." The first two items relate directly to the size of the
potential market for the Brueau's technical services in the Federal
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Republic of Nigeria and will be elaborated upon in succeeding paragraphs.
The last statement relates to our own moral obligation as a country,
especially in view of this sense of social justice which our country
perceives as pervading in the FRN°s own planning, to render every possible
assistance in the successful development of that country and requires no
further elaboration.
The Federal Republic of Nigeria has established a sound National
Development Plan utilizing both domestic and foreign capital. Expenditures
of the Nigerian Government In the implementation of the public sector of
this plan during its first two years of implementation have totaled some
150 million Nigerian pounds ($420 million U, S,) and it is anticipated
that this rate of expenditure will accelerate with time. For example,
the Central Bank of Nigeria issued in February of 1965 the Federal Republic
of Nigeria Second Development Loan in the amount of $42 million (this and
all remaining figures in $U. So). This is in addition to previous loan
issjaes of over $39 million. With regard to external financing, the
World Bank has committed over $160 million in economic development loans
and USAID has authorized $225 million (excluding the cost of some 600
Peace Corps Volunteers) of which some $118 million remains to be committed.
Areas of expenditures for capital projects within this framework are
various and extensive and include such items as roads, port development,
electrical generating and distribution facilities, educational facilities,
telecommunications, dams, railway facilities, water supply and distribution,
sewerage and drainage and civil aviation. The point is that the financing
for such capital projects apparently is and will continue to be available
in Nigeria,
All of the above certainly contributes to the potential market within
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the FKN for the utilization of the Bureau's technical services. But it
is in fact meaningless unless we can prove more conclusively and succintly
than the evidence presented in Table 3 and the conclusions generated
therefrom might indicate, that there is a definite and real need for
such assistance within the Nigerian Government, In this regard, it is
interesting to note that the following government agencies in the FKN
find it either necessary or desirable to utilize the services of
consulting engineers:
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Transport and Aviation
Ministry of Works and Surveys
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Mines and Power
Ministry of Communications
Ministry of Economic Development






While this might appear to be rather strong evidence of a real need
for technical assistance within the Nigerian Government, the writer must
confess to having saved for last the most important indication of the
potential market for the Bureau's technical services and the key to the
approach to Nigeria, On 31 March of 1965, in presenting his 1965 budget
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speech, the Federal Minister of Finance stated that "The main problems
which are encountered in attracting external finance - the tying of aid
to off-shore costs and to specific projects, the lack of skilled personnel
to undertake the feasibility studies and project appraisals required by
foreign lenders, and the very detailed project documentation which some
donor countries insist upon - still persist," The last two problems
mentioned are the most significant indication of the potential market and
the key to the approach to Nigeria, which should be technical assistance
tied in with and as an integral part of a technical training program. So
let us now proceed to develop a method of approach for such a program in
the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
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C. Method of Approach
In developing our method of approach for the organization and
initiation of an African technical assistance program within the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, it is probably best to start by reviewing the two
lessons learned in Latin America in attempting to effect such a program
and applying them to the African situation.
We will recall that the first conclusion reached from previous
experiences in the LA area was that the Bureau should attempt to
capitalize on its inherent expertise in the planning, design and
construction of waterfront facilities = The Federal Republic of Nigeria
would appear to present excellent opportunities to do exactly that.
Nigerian international commerce is expanding rapidly and existing port
facilities are grossly inadequate. For example, tonnage at Apapa Quay
alone has expanded from 766,000 cons deadweight during the year ending
31 March 1955 to 1,700,000 tons deadweight during the year ending 31 March
1965. The latter figure is 50% higher than the theoretical maximum capacity
with the facilities available. In this particular case, this situation
will be eased somewhat by new facilities that are under construction at
the present time, but the problem will remain far from solved and this
situation is indicative of the general conditions at other port facilities.
So there is, and will be for some time to come, considerable work to
be done in this area of port development which is vital to the continued
economic development of the country.
The second conclusion reached from previous experiences in Latin
America was that the Bureau should seek other means in addition to the
USAID organization to establish and maintain an African program.
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This can be rather neatly tied in with the first conclusion by making
the initial approaches to the Nigerian I»orts Authority. The implementation
of this part of the plan should present no real problem for the Bureau
has in the past and is at the present time performing work directly for
foreign governments. The initial in-country contacts should be made
through the U. S« Embassy in Lagos and details of any arrangements
with the Nigerian Government will have to be coordinated with and
approved by that Embassy » The previously quoted Minister of Finance's
statement relative to the lack of skilled technical personnel and the
requirements for detailed project documentation may be cited as the
impetus and Embassy personnel can be counted upon to be at least aware
of the problem and certainly desirous of seeing it solved. Further, and
quite important, the Bureau will not be competing with any other U, S,
Government organization whose representatives at the Embassy might
oppose these initial effortSo USAID personnel can not sit down and
prepare projects and feasibility studies for the Nigerians to submit
to their own Agency for their own approval, and even the U, S, Army Attache
would have a very difficult time questioning whether waterfront construction
falls within the Navy's purview. The USAID and other Embassy personnel
can be very useful in determining the needs of and initializing overtures
to the Nigerian Ports Authority, From there and as far as initial
contacts are concernedj the approach will have to be played pretty much
by ear, but consideration should certainly be given to contacting other
of the Nigerian governmental agencies depending on just how strong a
waterfront image of the Bureau is encountered. In this regard, the
Minister of Finance could probably be of very valuable assistance in
indicating those federal and regional agencies that are particularly
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weak in technical competence. The goal is to obtain a specific request
for ~ the Bureau's services from some sector of the Nigerian Government
and, since any such request will have to be submitted through the U. S.
Embassy, to prepare a favorable climate therein for its receipt.
The plan to be presented to the Nigerian Government is similar to
the one that was attempted, without any significant success, in Latin
America through the USAID organization, but this time working directly
with the Nigerian Government and concentrating on the Bureau's expertise
in waterfront construction, with special emphasis on the training
aspects of the program. The plan breaks down into three general phases
which may be summarized as follows:
First, the immediate assignment of a CEC Lieutenant Commander
or Commander to the Nigerian Ports Authority, During this phase the
officer assigned will develop manning requirements for the technical
services to be provided and for the implementation of the training
program, both of which will be tailored to meet the particular needs
and requirements encountered. Assistance in the form of on-site visits
by specialized BUDOCKS personnel will also be required during this phase
of determination of requirements.
Secondly, upon completion of the first phase and the approval by
the Nigerian Government of a proposed organizational staffing based on
requirements, the further implementation of the plan with the initiation
of recruitment and actual staffing of the organization. In actuality,
there will probably not be a definite line between this and the first
phase as the proposed staffing will most likely be submitted piecemeal
to the Nigerian Government in order to initiate civilian recruitment
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action on at least some billets at the earliest possible date, to allow
for a gradual and orderly buildup of the organization. This phase is
visualized as including the initialization of the training program on
a graduated basis in consonance with the development of the Bureau's
organization and continuing through to the attainment and maintenance of
the optimum organizational level, again, as dictated by requirements.
As the training program progresses and ultimately terminates, the
third and final phase of the plan, the gradual demobilization of U. S.
personnel, will be implemented,, The intermediate goal in this phase
could be either the complete withdrawal of U. S. personnel or the reduction
of same to a skeletal staff to function on a consulting basis or the
maintenance of a complete office to provide additional technical services,
the choice of course to be determined by the needs and desires of the
Nigerian Government, The ultimate goal, however, will be the eventual
complete withdrawal of all U. S. personnel, leaving behind a competent and
self-sufficient organization.
The training aspect of the plan, with which the Bureau has had
considerable experience, and the ultimate goal of working out of a job
should minimize if not completely eliminate any complaints of competition
from private U, S, consulting firms, who, generally speaking, have little
experience or interest in the former and less in the latter.
The above plan is based on providing these services to the Nigerian
Ports Authority. However, should it prove possible to overcome the
Bureau's waterfront image either at the outset or at some subsequent
point in time, it would be far more desirable to establish the organization
as an independent office providing technical services for and accepting
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trainees from several Nigerian governmental agencies. From the standpoint
of the Bureau's interests, the possibility of such an office becoming the
center or base for similar operations in other of the African states
is certainly worth more than a passing thought as is the effect
the existence of such an office might have on any future determination
by OASD (I&L) relative to the eventual assignment of the African area to
either BUDOCKS or the Army Corps of Engineers,
The matter of reimbursement for services should present no real
problem in view of the critical need for trained technical personnel and
the financing which is apparently available. With regard to the latter,
there is also a very good possibility of USAID providing at least some
financial assistance, particularly in view of the training aspects of the
plan. There is a requirement that business concerns can repatriate funds
only with the approval of the Nigerian Government exchange control
officials. Permission must also be obtained to export funds for the
settlement of overseas obligations, which would most likely include BUDOCKS
overhead. However, it is reported that legitimate requests to repatriate
funds are generally granted without restrictions and, particularly in
view of the Bureau's function, there is little likelihood of any
problems in this area.
The initial efforts to organize and establish such a program can
be counted upon to consume considerable time and effort. To do so by
means of only visits from Washington is considered to be highly impractical.
There is a definite requirement for a man on the spot to answer inquiries,
provide additional or clarifying information, to personally follow-up
on the progress of the numerous items involved in establishing the
program, and, most important, to become thoroughly familiar with the
political, economic, social and military climate in the area and sensitive
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to any changes thereto as they may evolve and develop. As we have previously
noted, there Is no existing practical organizational mechanism through
which such a billet might be established and which might be expected to
assist with the initial costs of travel and per diem involved in organizing
the program. The Bureau must, therefore, be prepared to bear these
initial expenses on the gamule, if you will, that they will subsequently
be recouped in overhead charges on future work generated as a result of
these efforts. Further, a new concept must be developed or, as will be
seen, an existing one adapted to provide the required billet. The writer
proposes the establishment within the structure of the U. S. Embassy in
Lagos of a billet, the occupant of which would be directly responsible
for the supervision of all efforts of the Bureau and the Corps in the
African area. Such a Lillet would be similar to the ones established
by the U. S. Marine Corps for the supervision of U. S, Embassy Marine
guards in the various geographical areas of the world and should be filled
by a highly competent CEC Lieutenant Commander or Commander, depending
upon the individual selectee's ability and experience.
Before proceeding further into the details of the billet, it is
well worth noting at this time that the obvious disadvantage of the
Bureau having to bear the complete costs of this billet is more than
offset by the fact that the individual officer assigned will have no
other demands upon his time than the efforts involved in effecting the
program which can, therefore, receive his full and undivided attention.
From the standpoint of the writer's personal experience in Latin America,
this is a very important factor as the LA efforts in this field were all
too often evershadowed by and, of necessity, placed secondary to the demands
of the U. S. Naval Missions and the U. So Military Assistance Program.
In cases of any conflicts in time or efforts between these two functions
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and the embryo LA program of the Bureau, the latter wound up in last
place which, though these precedences were absolutely correct, certainly
did not help to get the program off the ground. Further, the introduction
of another command structure with different aims and objectives is almost
certain to inhibit the Bureau's program and produce command personnel
whose reaction to same may vary from strong support through mere tolerance
to outright opposition, therby compounding considerably the already
numerous and varied problems inherent in organizing the program. So
while the independence of the billet must be paid for, it is considered
well worth the price.
Returning once again to the particular billet, the officer selected
must be carefully and thoroughly briefed by appropriate Bureau and Defense
and State Department personnel both in Washington and in-country on the
oft-repeated political, social, economic and military status of the area.
The officer involved should be given a free hand with regard to his
efforts and, most important, his authority to commit the Bureau, within
reason of course. In this regard and again from the writer's own personal
experience, there is probably no one single item of equal impartance to
the success of efforts of this nature as being able to make a commitment
right on the spot. Any delays, however short, in waiting for Bureau
approval of such a commitment result in a waning of whatever initial
enthusiasm may be generated on the part of the other party and, indeed,
the handling of negotiations through Washington, resulting in further
contact through the media of correspondence, complicates matters to a
highly disproportionate and incredible extent and, in most cases, almost
certainly dooms such efforts to failure. While these are strong words,
the importance of this aspect cannot be overemphasized. Finally and
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once again, the selection of the individual officer to fill this first
billet is of the utmost importance. It often happens that foreign
governmental personnel are more impressed with the individual they
encounter than with anything he may say about the capabilities of the
Bureau and the Corps. This selection must, therefore, be made with the
utmost care and precision.
Individual personnel selection, both civilian and military, for
the initial assignment and all subsequent ones which may develop should
not present much of a problem. As can be seen from Figure 3, there are
no requirements at the present time for the registration or licensing
of engineers to practice in the Federal Republic of Nigeria nor are
foreign engineers required to be licensed by their home country. Local
participation, that is, the hiring of Nigerian personnel, is not required
by law though the training aspects of the Bureau's proposal would dictate
the maximum feasible degree of participation by Nigerians, The metric
system is the official one used in the FRN and all work would have to
be done utilizing that system. However, this was also a requirement of
the Spanish Bases Construction Program and presented no real problem.
Finally and of considerable importance from the standpoint of individual
personnel selection, the official and commercial language of the country
Is English
o
There are, however, additional potential problem areas that will
require attention. All individuals are subject to an income tax by the
Federal Republic of Nigeria. This tax runs on a graduated scale from
5% for the first $1120., of income to 75% on any excess over $28,000.
The Bureau will no doubt wish to make arrangements to have its personnel
exempted from this taxo Considering the nature of the efforts involved,
the chances of obtaining such an exemption would appear to be favorable,
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though it is readily admitted that this is pure conjecture on the part
of the writer. There are, at least, no restrictions on the repatriation
of personal funds. Finally, while there is no apparent discrimination
practiced against U. S> consulting engineers, there does exist a tendency
to favor British firms due to long association. However, this too is
not considered to be a formidable obstacle especially in view of the
fact that we are speaking of a U, S„ Government organization rather than
an individual Uo So firm.
There are no doxibt other problems and problem areas which may arise
particularly in the early stages of initiating such a program, which can-
not be anticipated at this time. Then too, while the writer has attempted
to cover at least all the major potential problem areas and some of the
more significant minor ones, there may be others which have Inadvertently
been overlooked. But even considering a rather high probability of such
eventualities, the prospects for the success of the program as outlined
would appear to be most promising and certainly worthy of the relatively






In summary, we have seen in Part I after a rather thorough discussion
that there does exist a definite role for the Bureau of Yards and Docks
and the Civil Engineer Corps in the provision of technical assistance
to lesser developed nations. Indeed there are real advantages to be
gained from such a program by both the Bureau and the Corps and the
countries involved and these advantages far outweigh the additional
responsibilities, inconveniences and disadvantages inherent in the U. S.
Navy's involvement in such a program.
In Part II we have developed the theoretical but logical proof of
the existence of a definite need and high potential for the utilization
of technical assistance in the various and several Latin American and
African nations. We have also concluded that^ though there still exists
a definite need for such assistance in the Latin American area, the real
target of opportunity if you will lies to the east in the emerging
African states.
Finally, in Fart III we have solved the problem of where to initiate
such an African program by selecting as the starting point the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, In addition we have also developed a definite
program to be presented to that nation and have discussed the various
ramifications and potential problem areas involved in organizing and
initiating such a program in that country, finally concluding that the
potential for the success of the program is indeed great.
All of the above has been developed with the knowledge that the facts
of reality preclude the initiation of the African program and the
re^^urrpcion of the Latin American program until such time as the demands of
Southeast Asia permit o But it has also been developed in the sincere
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Abbreviations and Special Terms
A/E - architect - engineer
AID - United States Agency for International Development (also USAID)
ARD - a small, self-propelled floating drydock
BUDOCKS - Bureau of Yarda and Docks, United States Navy
CE - Corps of Engineers, United States Army
CEC - Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy
COMSOLANT - Commander U, S. Naval Forces South Atlantic
COMTEN - Commandant Tenth Naval District
COMUSNAVSO - Commander U. S„ Naval Forces Southern Command
DOD - United States Department of Defense
FRN - The Federal Republic of Nigeria
LA - Latin America or Latin American
MAP - United States Military Assistance Program
MCB - Mobile Construction Battalion, United States Navy
OASD(I&L) - Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Logistics, Ue So Department of
Defense
SEABEES - U. S. Naval Construction Forces
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - technical assistance in the fotrm of advice,
information and/or services.
The Bureau - The Bureau of Yards and Docks, United States Navy
The Chief of the Bureau - The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
United States Navy
The Corps - The Civil Engineer Corps , United States Navy






Figure 1 - Areas of Responsibility for Military Construction
Outside the United States.
Figure 2 - Engineering Practice Requirements, Latin America
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